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THE EFFECT OF LUCAS v. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUN-
CIL ON THE LAW OF REGULATORY TAKINGS
Ann T. Kadlecek
Abstract: In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the United States Supreme Court
established a two-part takings analysis. The first step is an "economically viable use"
threshold question, subject to a nuisance exception. The second step is a balancing test in
which courts weigh the public and private interests involved. Although this two-part anal-
ysis differs in structure from most lower court takings analyses, most courts already apply
a functionally equivalent test. Therefore, unless the Court alters the unit of land to which
it applies, this new analysis will have little effect on the outcome of takings challenges to
land use regulations.
All ownership and use of private property in the United States is
subject to restrictions designed to protect the public interest. These
restrictions may be imposed legislatively, as in zoning, or judicially
under the doctrines of public nuisance and public trust. In many
instances, the burden imposed on a property owner is outweighed by
the benefits the owner receives from similar restrictions on others. For
example, although residential zoning may limit the uses of private
property, the similar restrictions on nearby owners often raise the
market value of the land. In some instances, however, a regulation
can force an individual owner to bear an extreme burden. Under these
circumstances, the regulation may effect a Fifth Amendment taking,1
entitling the property owner to compensation.
While the principle of government compensation to prevent unfair
hardship is generally accepted, determining when a regulation "goes
too far" has been an inexact process.2 In recent years, the United
States Supreme Court has formulated two tests to identify when a tak-
ing has occurred. In the first, courts balance the state's interests
against the hardship imposed on an individual property owner.' In
the second, the courts separately consider two factors: the legitimacy
of the regulation's purpose and the economic viability of the remaining
uses for the property.4 During the 1980s, the Supreme Court often
referred to the second test, but it did not interpret the "economically
1. The Fifth Amendment states, in part, "nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
2. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (explaining that the question is
one "of degree," which "cannot be disposed of by general propositions").
3. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978).
4. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
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viable use" factor. Moreover, the Court did not explain the relation-
ship between the two tests.
The Supreme Court addressed these issues in Lucas v. South Caro-
lina Coastal Council. 5 In this case, David Lucas challenged a regula-
tion that prohibited all permanent construction on his beachfront
property. He claimed that the regulation deprived him of all economi-
cally viable use of his land, and that it therefore amounted to a taking.
The trial court found that the regulation indeed rendered the Lucas
property "valueless," and this finding was not contested. On appeal,
the United States Supreme Court addressed (1) whether a finding of
"valuelessness" constitutes deprivation of economically viable use and
(2) whether a regulation that removes all economically viable use nec-
essarily effects a taking.
In resolving these issues, the Supreme Court clarified the role of the
"economically viable use" test within a takings analysis that also
includes a nuisance exception and the balancing test. This Note exam-
ines the structure and application of the Lucas takings analysis, focus-
ing on the role and application of the "economically viable use" test.
Although Lucas will have little practical effect on takings challenges,
this decision may signal a future change in the property unit to which
the analysis applies. If adopted in a later decision, the change sug-
gested in Lucas would limit the region of land considered in the analy-
sis, greatly increasing the number of successful takings challenges.
I. TAKINGS DOCTRINE PRIOR TO LUCAS
For over a century, courts have struggled to develop an analysis
that identifies the point at which a land use restriction effects a Fifth
Amendment taking. During this time, the Supreme Court addressed
this question with vague, and sometimes inconsistent, formulations.
Nonetheless, in the last decade, most lower courts have settled on a
common approach to takings challenges. This consistency among the
lower courts extends even to the critically important determination of
the unit of land to which the test applies.
A. The Structure of the Takings Analysis
Early in this century, the Supreme Court's takings analysis was a
poorly defined "economic impact" test. Under this test, a regulation
could effect a taking if it caused severe individual hardship. Subse-
quently, the Court developed two distinct tests, each with an economic




component. The first was a balancing test in which the Court weighed
the interests of the public and the affected property owner. The gec-
ond was a two-part test in which the Court separately evaluated the
purpose of the regulation and the economic impact on the property
owner. Prior to Lucas, the Supreme Court repeatedly endorsed both
tests, but did not incorporate them into a single takings analysis.
1. The Original "Economic Impact" Formulation
In the late nineteenth century, most courts applied the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause only to cases involving government
acquisition or physical occupation of property.6 States could prohibit
uses of private property that were "injurious to the health, morals, or
safety of the community," 7 as long as the effect was not "arbitrary or
unreasonable."' Even a severe economic impact on an individual
landowner did not, by itself, render a regulation unreasonable.'
In spite of the breadth of this regulatory power, the primary focus of
nineteenth century state regulations was the prohibition of nui-
sances.10 By the early twentieth century, however, state regulations
had expanded to include zoning, which allowed the restriction of
activities that were merely "nuisance-like."' 1 Perhaps intending to
limit this expansion, the Supreme Court reinterpreted the Takings
Clause in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 2 to require compensation
when a regulation goes "too far"" a and causes a severe diminution in
the value of private property. 4 The Court did not, however, define
the severity of economic hardship necessary to constitute a taking.
Although the Court also questioned whether the public interest served
by the regulation warranted the interference with individual property
6. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 16 (2d ed. 1982); see, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887) (stating that a prohibition on the use of property is not a taking).
7. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669.
8. Eg., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S.
171, 177 (1915).
9. E.g., Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 405 (holding that a 92.5% diminution in value did not
amount to a taking); Mugler, 123 U.S. at 657 (holding that no taking occurred where a regulation
"very materially diminished" the property value).
10. Catherine R. Connors, Back to the Future: The "Nuisance Exception" to the Just
Compensation Clause, 19 CAP. U. L. REv. 139, 154-55 (1990).
11. Eg., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-89 (1926) (stating that zoning may
restrict commonplace uses, such as businesses or apartment houses, to specified areas); Reinman,
237 U.S. at 176 (holding that the state may "declare that in particular circumstances and...
localities a livery stable shall be deemed a nuisance").
12. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
13. Id. at 415.
14. Id. at 413.
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rights,15 the Pennsylvania Coal takings analysis did not expressly
require a balancing of public and private interests.
16
2. The Penn Central Balancing Test
Throughout the middle of the twentieth century, takings jurispru-
dence did not progress beyond, or clarify, the vague "too far" test of
Pennsylvania Coal. 17 In the 1970s, however, the increasing number of
restrictive regulations, often environmentally basel, triggered addi-
tional takings challenges,18 and highlighted the deficiencies in the "too
far" test. The Supreme Court responded with new frmulations of the
takings analysis.
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 9 the
Court's test was an "ad hoc, factual inquir[y]" into the fairness of the
regulation. This test required analysis of both the public interest fur-
thered by the regulation and the economic impact on the affected
property owner.20 To evaluate the public interest, the Court consid-
ered the nature of the regulation, including its purpose,21 its effective-
ness,22 and the necessity of the harm to the landowner.23 The Court
acknowledged that a state interest could justify the complete destruc-
tion of a property interest.24
To determine the economic impact on the individual, the Court has
examined three factors. First, the Court has looked to the effect of the
regulation on the market value of the land.25 Although any diminu-
tion in market value is relevant, even a large decrease in value has not
15. Id.
16. But see Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1190-91 n.53 (suggesting
that "some kind of a 'balancing' test may be intended"). Some commentators have suggested
that such a balancing renders the analysis a question of due process, rather than one of takings.
E.g., William B. Stoebuck, San Diego Gas: Problems, Pitfalls and a Better Way, 25 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 33 (1983). The role of due process in these analyses is, however, beyond
the scope of this Note.
17. See Stoebuck, supra note 16, at 14-16.
18. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 149
(1971).
19. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
20. Id. at 124-25.
21. Id. at 127.
22. Id. at 129 (explaining that the restriction must be an "appropriate means of securing the
purposes"); see also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (stating that
"constitutional propriety disappears ... if the condition ... utterly fails to further the end
advanced as the justification for the prohibition").
23. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127 (stating that a restriction "may constitute a 'taking' if
not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose").
24. Id. at 125.




been conclusive.26 Second, the Court has examined the uses that
remain for the property after the regulation takes effect.27 Although
the Court has not required compensation for the loss of the most prof-
itable use,28 it has indicated that compensation may be required when
a landowner is deprived of all reasonable remaining uses.29 Third, the
Court has considered the owner's reasonable "investment-backed
expectations" of land use and profitability.30 The primary such expec-
tation is the continuation of preexisting uses.31 In addition, this ele-
ment may preclude compensation when the owner can achieve a
reasonable return on his or her investment.32
The Penn Central Court did not define a level of economic impact
that triggers the compensation requirement. Instead, it used an
analysis of the economic impact and the state interest to determine
whether "justice and fairness" require compensation.33 Although this
approach does not involve a strict weighing of interests, the evaluation
of these factors is commonly referred to as a balancing test.
34
3. The Agins Two-Part Test
In Agins v. City of Tiburon,35 the Supreme Court established a sec-
ond takings test. This two-part test required separate consideration of
the state interests and the economic viability of the remaining uses.
According to Agins, "[t]he application of a general zoning law to a
particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substan-
tially advance legitimate state interests ... or denies an owner eco-
nomically viable use of his land."36 This test does not suggest a
balancing of interests. Instead, a court must first examine whether the
regulation substantially furthers a legitimate state interest. If it does
not, the regulation effects a taking.37 Otherwise, the court proceeds to
26. Id.
27. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138 (considering whether the regulation permits "reasonable
beneficial use").
28. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962).
29. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 137 n.36.
30. Id. at 127 (stating that "a state statute that substantially furthers important public
policies may so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a 'taking' ").
31. Id. at 136.
32. Id at 136, 137 n.36.
33. Id. at 123.
34. See, eg., MANDELKER, supra note 6, at 22; Gary Minda, The Dilemmas of Property and
Sovereignty in the Postmodern Era: The Regulatory Takings Problem, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 599,
612 (1991).
35. 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
36. Id.
37. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987).
419
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determine whether an economically viable use remains for the prop-
erty. The Agins Court's use of the conjunction "or" indicates that a
regulation that furthers a legitimate purpose may stil effect a taking if
it denies economically viable use of the property.
The Agins Court, however, did not invalidate the Penn Central bal-
ancing test. Instead, the Court affirmed the test by cbserving that "no
precise rule determines when property has been taken, . . . [and] the
question necessarily requires a weighing of private and public inter-
ests."' 38 The Court did not explain the relationship between the Agins
test and the Penn Central balancing approach. :Furthermore, the
Supreme Court did not explain the criteria for evaluating economic
viability. In subsequent cases, the Court has merely restated the test
without applying the "economically viable use" portion.39 Conse-
quently, the lower courts have received minimal guidance in the appli-
cation of the "economically viable use" element of t.he Agins test.
B. Recent Lower Court Approaches to Takings Decisions
Since 1980, most lower courts have applied the Agins two-part test
in their own takings analyses. These courts have defined the term
"economically viable use" to include nearly any use that alters the
land's natural state. Because of this approach, most land use regula-
tions have withstood takings challenges.
1. Application of the "Economically Viable Use" Test
In the last decade, most lower courts have applied the Agins two-
part test, either alone or in combination with the Penn Central balanc-
ing test, to resolve takings challenges. 40 Most courts have applied the
two-part test exclusively, holding that there is no taking if both parts
of the test are satisfied.41 When a regulation furthers a legitimate state
38. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-61.
39. E.g., Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834; Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 485 (1987).
40. But see Sadowsky v. City of New York, 732 F.2d 312, 317 (2d Cir. 1984) (describing the
entire takings inquiry as a balancing of interests); Rowe v. Town of Ncrth Hampton, 553 A.2d
1331, 1334 (N.H. 1989) (holding that the lack of economically viable use is not determinative).
41. E.g., Reahard v. Lee County, 968 F.2d 1131, 1136 (11th Cir. 1992); Kaiser Dev. Co. v.
City and County of Honolulu, 913 F.2d 573, 575 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1414
(1991); O'Connor v. Corps of Engineers, United States Army, 801 F. Supp. 185, 198 (N.D. Ind.
1992); Elsemere Park Club Ltd. Partnership v. Town of Elsemere, 771 F Supp. 646, 653 (D. Del.
1991); Formanek v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 785, 797 (1989); Glisson v. Alachua County, 558
So. 2d 1030, 1035 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 570 So. 2d 1304 (1990); St. Lucas Ass'n v.
City of Chicago, 571 N.E.2d 865, 876 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Department of Natural Resources v.
Indiana Coal Council, Inc., 542 N.E.2d 1000, 1002 (Ind. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1130




interest, these courts have required plaintiffs in takings challenges to
demonstrate the absence of remaining economically viable uses.42
Most of these courts have not expressly applied a balancing test, and
the presence of any economically viable use has been sufficient to
defeat a takings claim.43
A few courts have applied the Agins test in conjunction with the
Penn Central balancing test. In these courts, a regulation could not
defeat a takings challenge unless it passed both tests.44 Using this
approach, a court could find a taking even when the regulation fur-
thered a legitimate state interest and the deprivation of value or use
was less than complete. In these courts, as in the majority, a regula-
tion that permitted no economically viable use effected a taking.45
2. The Definition of "Economically Viable Use"
To determine whether an economically viable use remains, lower
courts have looked to the three economic factors developed by the
Supreme Court for use in the Penn Central balancing test.46 First, the
courts have looked to the effect of the regulation on the market value
of the land. While most courts have held that diminution in value is
relevant, even a significant loss of value, alone, has not amounted to a
deprivation of economically viable use.47 Because a loss of market
value is rarely complete, this factor has not generally been sufficient,
Cincinnati, 526 N.E.2d 1350, 1357 (Ohio 1988); Jones v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 578 A.2d 1369,
1372 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990); City of Virginia Beach v. Virginia Land Inv. Ass'n No. 1, 389
S.E.2d 312, 314 (Va. 1990); see also Richard G. Wilkins, The Takings Clause: A Modern Plot for
an Old Constitutional Tale, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 32, 32 n.222 (1989) (stating that most
courts only find a taking when the owner is deprived of all value or use).
42. Eg., Bernardsville Quarry, Inc. v. Borough of Bernardsville, 608 A.2d 1377, 1386 (N.J.
1992).
43. E.g., Kaiser Dev., 913 F.2d at 575-76.
44. E.g., McNulty v. Town of Indialantic, 727 F. Supp. 604, 608-14 (M.D. Fla. 1989);
Woolston v. Monticello Orderly Annexation Area Bd., No. CO-90-1389, 1990 WL 204290, at *2
(Minn Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1990).
45. E-g., McNulty, 727 F. Supp. at 608; St. Lucas, 571 N.E.2d at 875.
46. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text; see, eg., Reahard v. Lee County, 968 F.2d
1131, 1136 (11th Cir. 1992); Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 939 F.2d 165, 169-70
(4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992); MacLeod v. County of Santa Clara, 749
F.2d 541, 546-47 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2705 (1985); Department of Natural
Resources v. Indiana Coal Council, Inc., 542 N.E.2d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1131 (1990); Bernardsville Quarry, 608 A.2d at 1383, 1386-88.
47. E-g., Kaiser Dev., 913 F.2d at 575; Stratford v. State-House, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 1008, 1013
(E.D. Ky. 1982); Long Beach Equities, Inc., v. County of Ventura, 282 Cal. Rptr. 877, 889 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992); Gil v. Inland Wetlands and Watercourses
Agency of Greenwich, 593 A.2d 1368, 1373 (Conn. 1991); Bernardsville Quarry, 608 A.2d at
1386. Butsee Lockary v. Kayfetz, 917 F.2d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that a loss of the
major portion of value is deprivation of economically viable use).
Washington Law Review
by itself, to establish a taking. Second, courts have ,generally required
regulations to permit uses of the land beyond those uses available in
the natural state. Regulations that permit some construction have
been consistently upheld,48 even when the level of construction was
minimal, as in a golf course,49 nursery50 or dude ranch.51 Most courts
have also found agricultural uses to be economically viable.52 Third,
courts have considered the owner's expectations of land use and profit-
ability. As in the Penn Central balancing test,53 the most important
factor in assessing these expectations is the use prior to the regula-
tion. 4 Even without improvements, courts may consider a prior use
to be economically viable.5 5 In most cases, analysis of these factors
has supported a finding of an economically viable use unless the regu-
lation forced the land to remain in its natural state.
56
C. The "Piecemealing" Problem: Identifying the Unit of Land in
the Takings Analysis
Because the existence of some remaining value and use for the prop-
erty may defeat a takings challenge, the unit of land chosen for the
analysis is critically important.5 7 Although the Su~preme Court has
not provided a clear definition of the appropriate unit of property for a
takings analysis, it has indicated that, at a minimum, courts are not to
48. Eg., Keith v. Town Council of West Hartford, No. CV-90- 3748015, 1992 WL 139183, at
*7 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 5, 1992); Jones v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 578 A.2d 1369, 1371-72 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1990).
49. Kaiser Dev., 913 F.2d at 576.
50. St. Lucas Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 571 N.E.2d 865, 876 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
51. Lake Nacimiento Ranch Co. v. County of San Luis Obispo, 830 F.2d 977, 982 (9th Cir.
1987), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 79 (1988).
52. Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township, 808 F.2d 1023, 1031 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 2482 (1987); Furey v. City of Sacramento, 592 F. Supp. 463, 467 (E.D. Cal.
1984), aff'd, 780 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1986); Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands Comm'n, 593
A.2d 251, 262 (N.J. 1991); Chokecherry Hills Estates, Inc. v. Deuel County, 294 N.W.2d 654,
656 (S.D. 1980).
53. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
54. E.g., MacLeod v. Santa Clara County, 749 F.2d 541, 547 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 2705 (1985).
55. E.g., id. (stating that holding for investment with interim use as a cattle ranch is an
economically viable use); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893, 902 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (identifying camping as an
economically viable use), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 866 (1990); Hall v. Bcard of Envtl. Protection,
528 A.2d 453, 456 (Me. 1987) (viewing renting a mobile home as economically viable); Shopco
Group v. City of Springdale, 586 N.E.2d 145, 150 (Ohio Ct. App.) (holding that a park is
economically viable), cert. dismissed, 563 N.E.2d 302 (Ohio 1990).
56. E.g., Gil v. Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Agency of Greenwich, 593 A.2d 1368,
1373-74 (Conn. 1991); Vatalaro v. Department of Envtl. Regulation, 6C 1 So. 2d 1223, 1229 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1992); see also Lockary v. Kayfetz, 917 F.2d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1990).
57. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
Vol. 68:415, 1993
Regulatory Takings
divide a single piece of property into multiple estates."8 In addition,
the Court has considered ownership rights attached to separate pieces
of land when determining the economic impact on the property
owner. 9 Accordingly, at least in some cases, the appropriate unit of
land for the takings analysis may extend beyond the boundary of the
affected plot.
Most lower courts have similarly rejected "piecemealing" of a single
plot into multiple interests or portions. These courts have held that
the appropriate unit of land for a takings analysis is all contiguous
land with a common owner.' In these jurisdictions, a regulation may
deprive an owner of all uses of a portion of the land, as long as an
economically viable use remains for the rest of the property. For
example, a regulation that prohibits construction on 75% of a piece of
property does not necessarily effect a taking.6" Similarly, a state may
prevent an owner of two contiguous lots from building more than one
house without providing compensation.62
In special circumstances, some courts have "piecemealed" land into
smaller units, creating exceptions to the general rule that contiguous
land is considered as a whole. For example, courts have sometimes
considered mining rights separately from surface rights. 63 Occasion-
58. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (holding that
the support estate and mineral estate are not viewed separately, and making no distinction
between coal that could, and could not, be mined); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York,
438 U.S. 104 (1978) (holding that air rights and surface rights are not separate interests); see also
Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part I- A Critique
of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1299, 1309 (1989).
59. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31, 137 (considering the transferability of air rights above
the terminal to the owner's other parcels in the vicinity).
60. E.g., Bevan v. Brandon Township, 475 N.W.2d 37, 43 (Mich. 1991) (holding that two
contiguous lots, with separate tax numbers and purchased at different times, are viewed as a
whole), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 941 (1992). In rare instances, where the plots were linked by the
owner's actions, some courts have also considered noncontiguous plots as a unit. Eg., Ciampitti
v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 320 (1991) (holding that the owner's view of the parcels as
"linked" justifies evaluation of the noncontiguous parcels as a whole); see also Deltona Corp. v.
United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1192 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (considering contiguous tracts of land and
regions within the affected tracts), cert denied, 102 S. Ct. 1712 (1982). But see J.M. Scott &
Assoc., Inc. v. Inland Wetlands and Water Conservation Comm'n, Nos. 0054193 to 0054195,
1991 WL 172832, at *5 n.3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 1991) (stating that "there is no authority
allowing the Commission to force plaintiff to treat its three lots as one building lot").
61. Keith v. Town Council of West Hartford, No. CV-90-3748015, 1992 WL 139183, at
*6-*7 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 5, 1992); see also Jones v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 578 A.2d 1369,
1371-72 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (holding that a landowner may be prevented from building on
70% of property).
62. Bevan, 475 N.W.2d at 46-47.
63. Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169, 1174 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 406 (1991). But see Mid Gulf, Inc. v. Bishop, 792 F. Supp. 1205, 1214 (D. Kan. 1992)
(finding no taking when mining interests were restricted, because surface rights have value);
423
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ally, courts have viewed the appropriate unit as the portion affected by
a zoning restriction. 6 One court has even allowed the complaint to
determine the appropriate unit of land.65 These instances of
"piecemealing" are, however, exceptions to the general rule.
II. LUCAS v. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL
In 1986, David Lucas paid nearly one million dollars for two vacant
lots near the coast of a South Carolina barrier island.6 6 Two years
later, the South Carolina legislature enacted the Beachfront Manage-
ment Act,67 which prohibited all permanent habitable construction in
a coastal region that included the Lucas lots.68 Mr. Lucas sued for
compensation under the Fifth Amendment, claiming that the Act
completely destroyed the value of his land.69 In response, the South
Carolina Coastal Council denied that compensation was due, because
the regulation was "enacted to prevent serious put lic harm."7 The
South Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the Ccastal Council. In
spite of the trial court's uncontested finding that the regulation ren-
dered the Lucas property "valueless,"'" the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that the economic harm did not require compensation.72
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that
regulations that deny "all economically beneficial or productive use of
land" are subject to "categorical treatment. ' 73  This treatment entitles
landowners to compensation unless the restriction "inhere[s] in the
Bernardsville Quarry, Inc. v. Borough of Bernardsville, 608 A.2d 1377, 1389 (N.J. 1992)
(considering surface rights when determining the effect of restriction on removal of stone).
64. E.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 154 (1990) (viewing the
wetland portion of property separately from the whole); Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 720 P.2d
528, 539 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (considering only the largest of three contiguous parcels when
evaluating the economic effect), aff'd in part, 720 P.2d 513 (Ariz.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577
(1986); Twain Harte Assoc., Ltd. v. County of Tuolumne, 265 Cal. Rptr. 737, 744 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990) (explaining that the nature of the land use regulation may create separate parcels for taking
purposes).
65. Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township, 808 F.2d 1023, 1031, 1031 n.6 (3d Cir.)
(explaining that the court need not address the question of the appropriate unit because the
complaint only alleged a taking of a portion of the property), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2482
(1987).
66. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2889 (1992).
67. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-250 to -360 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
68. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889-90.
69. Id. at 2890.
70. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C. 1991), rev'd, 112 S.
Ct. 2886 (1992).
71. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2890.
72. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 898.
73. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893. The Court suggested that this treatment may not apply to
personal property. Id. at 2899-2900.
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title itself."'7 4 Under this analysis, David Lucas is entitled to compen-
sation unless the state demonstrates, on remand, that home construc-
tion on his lots falls within the exception.75
The Court used traditional nuisance law to define the uses that were
not originally part of the owner's title.7 6 The exception does not
include restrictions that are "newly legislated," unless they are
grounded in the "background principles of the State's law of property
and nuisance."' 77 Thus, to determine whether a given use falls within
the exception, a court must consider the harm caused by the use, the
social value of the use, and the existence of other means to prevent the
harm. 8 If this analysis indicates that the prohibited use is a nuisance,
the exception applies and the owner is not entitled to compensation.
In dicta, the Supreme Court also indicated the role of the "economi-
cally viable use" test within the general takings analysis. The Court
noted that an owner who does not suffer enough hardship to claim the
benefit of the "categorical formulation" may still recover under the
general takings analysis.79 This general analysis entails further exami-
nation of the economic impact on the property owner.8 0 Thus, failure
to qualify for relief under the "economically viable use" test does not
preclude recovery in a takings challenge.
III. THE LUCAS DOCTRINE AND ITS EFFECT ON
TAKINGS DECISIONS
In resolving Lucas, the Court applied the "economically viable use"
test and suggested a general analysis that will apply to all takings deci-
sions. Although this approach differs in structure from the tests
applied in most lower courts, it is functionally equivalent to most
lower court analyses and thus will not affect the outcome of most deci-
sions. On the other hand, the Court also suggested a change in the
unit of land to which the analysis applies. If adopted in a future rul-
ing, this change could significantly increase the number of successful
challenges to land use regulations.
74. Id. at 2900.
75. Id. at 2901-02.
76. Id. at 2900.
77. Id. A legislated regulation must "do no more than duplicate the result that could have
been achieved in the courts... under the State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under its
complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise." Id. By
"otherwise," the Court stated that it meant "cases of actual necessity," where the state acts "to
forestall.., grave threats to the lives and property of others." Id. at n.16.
78. Id. at 2901.




A. The Structure of the Lucas Takings Doctrine
The Lucas Court incorporated the "economically viable use" test,
along with a nuisance exception and the balancing test, into a single
takings analysis. The Court's "categorical treatment" of regulations
denying economically beneficial use 81 indicates that the "economically
viable use" test is a threshold question. This test determines the subse-
quent analysis. When a regulation fails to permit an economically via-
ble use, a court must determine whether the state is exempt from the
compensation requirement under a nuisance exception.82
If a regulation satisfies the threshold test, it is further analyzed
under the Penn Central balancing test. Although -the Court did not
refer to this test by name, this conclusion is implicit in the majority's
discussion of the "takings analysis generally."' 83 The Court described
this general analysis as one in which courts reconsider the economic
impact on the property owner. The only other Supreme Court takings
analysis that includes this factor is the Penn Central balancing test.
Therefore, the balancing test is an element of the Lucas takings analy-
sis, and applies to regulations that pass the threshold "economically
viable use" test.84
B. The Effect of the Lucas Takings Analysis
The Lucas analysis will have no significant effect on lower court
takings decisions because most courts currently apply an analysis that
produces equivalent results. First, nearly all lower courts use the
"economically viable use" test in a manner consistent with Lucas.
Second, most courts effectively, if not expressly, perform a balancing
test. Third, the nuisance exception added by the Court will have little
substantive effect because nearly all of the regulations that fail the
"economically viable use" test will also fail to qualify for the excep-
tion. Therefore, although Lucas altered the structure of the takings
analysis, it will not affect the outcome of most takings decisions.
1. The Effect of the Court's Endorsement of the "Biconomically
Viable Use" Test
Although Lucas is the first Supreme Court decision based on the
"economically viable use" test, lower courts have routinely applied
81. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 107-16 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
84. One court has similarly interpreted the Court's discussion of the "takings analysis




this test. Most courts currently decide takings challenges using the
Agins two-part test, either exclusively or in combination with the Penn
Central balancing test. 85  Under either approach, courts apply the
"economically viable use" test, and a regulation that deprives a land-
owner of economically viable use effects a taking. 6 Therefore, the
Lucas Court's holding that deprivation of "all economically beneficial
uses" constitutes a taking8 7 will have no effect on the majority of tak-
ings claims in the lower courts.
88
2. The Effect on the Definition of "Economically Viable Use"
The Lucas Court indicated two factors that are relevant to deter-
mining whether property has an economically viable use. The first is
the remaining market value of the land. If a regulation renders prop-
erty "valueless", then no economically viable use remains. 89 However,
a severe diminution in market value, such as 95%, does not, by itself,
constitute deprivation of economically viable use.90 The second factor
is the remaining uses available to the landowner. 91 The Court gave
little specific guidance for the application of this factor, but did indi-
cate that a regulation that requires land to be left substantially in its
natural state deprives the owner of economically viable use.92
The Court's discussion of these two factors is consistent with lower
court definitions of "economically viable use." When a regulation fur-
thers a legitimate state interest, most courts have not found a taking
unless the regulation forces the land to remain in its natural state.
93
Because the regulation at issue in Lucas kept the property in its natu-
ral state,94 the Court did not determine whether regulations that allow
some development might also deny economically viable use. Conse-
quently, nothing in the Court's opinion suggests a change in the lower
court approach. Economically viable uses should continue to include
85. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
88. For the few states that have not been using the Agins test, or that have modified it
through a sweeping insulation doctrine, Lucas will require a significant change. See, e.g., Powers
v. Skagit County, 67 Wash. App. 180, 190, 835 P.2d. 230, 234, (1992).
89. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2895 n.8 (1992).
90. Id. (stating that at least in some cases, a landowner suffering a 95% loss will get nothing).
91. Id. at 2893 (stating that a regulation may not deny "productive use of land").
92. Id. at 2894-95 (explaining that regulations that leave the owner without economically
viable use are typically those that require the land to be left substantially in its natural state); see
also id. at 2894 n.7 (implying that a regulation leaving 90% of a piece of property in its natural
state deprives the landowner of all economically viable use of 90% of the property).
93. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
94. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895.
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all uses, including agriculture and home construction, that allow alter-
ation of the land's natural state.95
3. The Effect on the Outcome of Lower Court Decisions
The courts that use the Agins two-part test as the entire takings
analysis96 should convert the "economically viable use" test into a
threshold question and add an express balancing step. Under this
modification, a determination that a regulation substantially furthers a
legitimate purpose and does not deny all economically viable use will
no longer be sufficient to defeat a takings challenge. Instead, a court
must subsequently examine the regulation according to the Penn Cen-
tral balancing test. In spite of this analytical change, Lucas will have
no practical effect on takings decisions because (1) courts have often
considered the same factors in applying the Agins two-part and Penn
Central balancing tests and (2) courts have generally used a balancing
approach in applying the Agins test.
a. Similarity of Factors Between the Agins Two-Part and Penn
Central Balancing Tests
Modifying the Agins analysis will not require courts to consider new
factors in their takings decisions. Both the Agins two-part test and the
Penn Central balancing test require consideration of two broad issues:
the nature of the state interest served by the regulation and the eco-
nomic impact on the individual landowner. In the lower courts, the
factors that are relevant to these issues are the same, regardless of
which test a court applies.
The lower courts generally interpret the first element of the Agins
test, substantial furtherance of a legitimate state interest, as requiring
consideration of the same factors as the "state interest" element of the
Penn Central balancing test.97 These courts consider the purpose of
the regulation when they examine the "legitimacy" of the state inter-
est.98 In addition, they consider the effectiveness and necessity of the
95. See supra note 56.
96. See supra note 41.
97. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
98. E.g., Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 939 F.2d 165, 169 (4th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992); First English Evangelical Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893, 901 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 866 (1990);
Orlando/Orange County Expressway Auth. v. W. & F. Agrigrowth-Fernfield, Ltd., 582 So. 2d
790, 792 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 591 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 1991); Department of Natural
Resources v. Indiana Coal Council, Inc., 542 N.E.2d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.





regulation when they examine whether the regulation "substantially
furthers" its purported purpose.99 Thus, the structural change in the
analysis will not alter the "state interest" factors in the lower courts'
approach.
Similarly, the Penn Central balancing test and Agins "economically
viable use" test contain the same "economic impact" factors. Courts
have considered all of the economic elements of the Penn Central bal-
ancing test when determining whether the second requirement of the
Agins test is met." 0 Furthermore, the interpretation of these factors'is
the same in the two tests because courts generally have transferred
Supreme Court language regarding the balancing test to the context of
the "economically viable use" test. For example, when discussing the
diminution in value, many courts cite Penn Central or Keystone, and
state that diminution in value, while relevant, is not sufficient to estab-
lish a taking.101 Therefore, the addition of a balancing test to lower
court analysis under Lucas will not result in the consideration of new
"state interest" or "economic impact" factors.
b. Application of the Agins Test as a Balancing Process
A balancing test is, in theory, different from separate consideration
of the state interest and the economic impact. This distinction, how-
ever, has no practical effect because courts commonly, if not expressly,
apply the Agins test as a balancing test. 102 A few courts have inter-
preted the Agins two-part test as another form of the Penn Central
balancing test.103 These courts have expressly used the Penn Central
99. E.g., Esposito, 939 F.2d at 169; Gilbert v. State, 266 Cal. Rptr. 891, 903 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990); Indiana Coal Council, 542 N.E.2d at 1003; McElwain v. County of Flathead, 811
P.2d 1267, 1271 (Mont. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 868 (1992); Gardner v. New Jersey
Pinelands Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251, 257 (N.J. 1991); Finch v. City of Durham, 384 S.E.2d 8, 14
(N.C. 1989); Jones v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 578 A.2d 1369, 1370 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990). But see
Bevan v. Brandon Township, 475 N.W.2d 37, 45 (Mich. 1991) (holding that the plaintiff has the
burden of proof and must do more than merely assert that the restriction is unnecessary), cert.
dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 941 (1992).
100. See supra note 46.
101. E.g., O'Connor v. Corps of Engineers, United States Army, 801 F. Supp. 185, 198 (N.D.
Ind. 1992); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1191 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 1712 (1982); Twain Harte Assoc., Ltd. v. County of Tuolumne, 265 Cal. Rptr. 737, 741
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Bevan, 475 N.W.2d at 46.
102. See Natasha Zalkin, Shifting Sands and Shifting Doctrines: The Supreme Court's Takings
Doctrine and South Carolina's Coastal Zone Statute, 79 CAL. L. REV. 205, 258 n.257 (1991); see
also I EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 6-29 to
-30 (1992) (The reasonable use test "is essentially a crystallization and narrowing of the broader
'balancing of interests' analysis .... ").
103. Eg., Deltona, 657 F.2d at 1192 (explaining that the Agins two-part test requires a
weighing of public and private interests); Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 720 P.2d 528, 535 (Ariz.
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balancing approach to determine whether an economically viable use
exists. In their analysis, they have made no distinction between the
two takings tests. Other courts have allowed the Agins "state interest"
determination to affect the "economically viable use" analysis, but
have not acknowledged the balancing process. These courts are less
likely to characterize the allowable uses as economically viable when
they find no legitimate state purpose. For example, when a regulation
furthers an improper purpose, such as lowering the value of land
prior to condemnation, some courts have held that a preexisting agri-
cultural use was not economically viable,"° despite nearly universal
holdings to the contrary.10 5 Even residential uses ray fail the "eco-
nomically viable use" test when the regulation does riot further a legit-
imate state interest. 106 Thus, courts consider a deficiency in the
legitimacy of the state interests when making the "economically viable
use" determination.
This process results in an effective balancing of competing interests.
The addition of an express balancing test will only make the current
procedure explicit. This modification does not add a new analysis to
the lower court regulatory takings doctrine, and thus will not alter the
outcome of most takings challenges.
c. The Minimal Effect of the Nuisance Exception
The nuisance exception to the "economically viable use" test should
exclude regulations that restrict uses that were, or could have been,
declared nuisances at common law. 10 7 According to the current law
of nuisance, this exception will exclude nearly all of the regulations
that fail the "economically viable use" test. Therefore, the Lucas nui-
sance exception will have little immediate effect on takings decisions.
The nuisance exception should apply only to common law nui-
sances. Although the Lucas Court did not explicitly restrict the
Ct. App. 1985) (explaining that the issue addressed by the Agins test is "whether the public at
large, rather than a few landowners, should bear the burden of an exercise of police power"),
aff'd in part, 720 P.2d 513 (Ariz.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986).
104. E.g., Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169, 1174 (Fed. Cir.) (holding
that farming was not an "economically viable use" when the state's purpose was to acquire the
land), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991); Rippley v. City of Lincoln, 330 N.W.2d 505, 508 n.3
(N.D. 1983) (holding that growing hay was not an "economically viaale use" when the state
purpose was the eventual acquisition of the land at a depreciated price).
105. See supra note 52.
106. E.g., Sheerr v. Township of Evesham, 445 A.2d 46 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982);
W.O. Brisben Co. v. Montgomery, 591 N.E.2d 828, 830 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
107. Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, interpreted the majority's definition to include only
common law nuisances. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2912 n.15




exception in this manner, the Court's limitation of the legislative
power to "newly define" nuisances10 8 has this effect. The Court
acknowledged the power of legislatures to "abate nuisances," but it
indicated that this power extends only to uses that could have been
declared nuisances judicially, under common law principles.109 There-
fore, the nuisance exception should permit legislative prohibition,
without compensation, of uses that pose an unreasonable present
threat to use and enjoyment of property.110 For these purposes, a
threat is unreasonable if a reasonable person would think that its
severity outweighs the utility of the conduct, or if the public harm
caused by the conduct could be diminished without materially
decreasing the benefits to the property owner.'
Determining whether statutorily prohibited conduct constitutes a
nuisance under this exception is highly fact-dependent. Courts must
consider the nature and extent of the harm caused, the ability of the
person harmed to avoid that harm, the suitability of the use for the
location, and the burden on the acting person if the conduct is prohib-
ited. 1 2 Most uses may, depending on the precise situation, constitute
nuisances under this analysis. Courts should, however, generally
exclude home construction from the exception, except in rare
instances where a reasonable person would consider such a use unrea-
sonable in the location. 113 The severe burden on the landowner and
the existence of similar uses on indistinguishable pieces of property in
the vicinity will weigh against a nuisance determination in such
cases. 14 Thus, a prohibition of home construction, at least in popu-
lated areas such as that in Lucas, is not likely to be exempt from com-
pensation under the nuisance exception.
Because courts should rarely consider home construction a nui-
sance, the exception excludes the very regulations most likely to fail
the threshold test. Of the regulations that pass the first element of the
Agins test, furthering a proper state purpose, the "economically viable
108. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 822 (1977); see also Connors, supra note 10, at
183. A similar definition has also appeared in prior Supreme Court opinions. E.g., Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 145 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
111. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 86, at
630-31 (5th ed. 1984). This definition also includes threats of future injury. Id. at 620.
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 827-28 (1977).
113. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901 (1992) ("It seems
unlikely that common-law principles would have prevented the erection of any habitable or
productive improvements on petitioner's land ... .
114. KEETON ET AL., supra note 111, at 633.
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use" test will affect only those that effectively prohibit construction,
agriculture, and all other profitable uses.115 An otherwise proper reg-
ulation that leaves the landowner able to pursue one of these activities
allows an economically viable use, and the threshold test will not affect
such regulations. Because most land is suitable for either construction
or agriculture, the large majority of regulations that fail the threshold
test will be those that explicitly restrict both of these activities.
Such regulations will rarely fall within the nuisance exception.
Neither construction nor agriculture currently meets the test of
"grounding" in "background principles of nuisance and property
law."'1 16 This is because both are commonly practiced and viewed as
appropriate activities, and the prohibition of either generally results in
a severe burden for the landowner. Only in rare situations where the
public problem is severe enough to alter public perceptions of reason-
able land use should courts invoke the exception and eliminate the
requirement for compensation. Therefore, the nuisance exception
does not cover the majority of regulations that will fail the "economi-
cally viable use" test, and it will have little immediate effect on the
application of the "economically viable use" test.
C The Effect of Permitting "Piecemealing"
Although the Lucas doctrine will have no significant immediate
effect on takings decisions, the Lucas Court also suggested a decrease
in the unit of property that courts should consider in the takings anal-
ysis. If this change is made in the future, it could radically alter the
doctrine, rendering many currently acceptable regulations violations
of the Fifth Amendment.
Because of the courts' focus on remaining value and uses, the selec-
tion of the unit of property for analysis may determine the outcome of
a takings challenge.117 If a court "piecemeals" property into narrowly
defined interests, it is more likely to find a taking. For example, a
regulation could deny an owner economically viable use of two acres
out of a ten-acre plot. If a court looks only at the affected portion, a
taking under the Agins test has occurred. However, if the court looks
115. See supra notes 48-52. A regulation may prohibit all economically viable use without
explicitly restricting construction or agriculture, if the land is not suitable for such uses. Thus, a
mining restriction may remove all economically viable use if the surface of the land has been
rendered unsuitable for construction or agriculture by mining activity before promulgation of the
regulation. See, e.g., Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1197 n. 17 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1251 (1982).
116. See supra note 77.
117. See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57




at the entire plot, and 80% of the value and use remains, then the
"economically viable use" test would not indicate a taking.
The state and lower federal courts generally accept the view that the
appropriate unit of land for a takings analysis is all contiguous land
with a common owner.11 After Lucas, however, the Supreme Court
may take the position that the "economically viable use" test should
be applied to smaller portions of the owner's property. The Lucas
Court dismissed Penn Central's consideration of the owner's other
holdings in the area as "unsupportable." '119 It suggested instead that
the appropriate unit should be determined by the owner's expecta-
tions, based on interests in land that the particular state specifically
recognizes. 120 This view is in agreement with previous dissenting
statements by Chief Justice Rehnquist,121 and this dicta in Lucas sug-
gests that the current majority may have adopted Rehnquist's view.
If a future holding incorporates this change, it will drastically alter
the takings analysis applied to land use regulations. Regulations that
deprive an owner of the use of a legally recognized portion of land,
defined by deed or, perhaps, by zoning boundaries, could result in a
taking of that portion. For example, in Bevan v. Brandon Township, 122
the plaintiff owner of contiguous lots was denied compensation, even
though he was only permitted to build one house on the combined
property. This plaintiff might, in the future, be able to demonstrate a
taking by showing that no construction could proceed on one of the
lots.
In addition, the suggested change would undermine state protection
for wetlands and other environmentally sensitive regions. Under the
current approach, a state may designate a portion of an owner's prop-
erty a wetland, subject to severe building restrictions, as long as eco-
nomically viable use remains for the rest of the property. Under the
formulation suggested in Lucas, this designation could effect a taking
of the wetland portion. The adoption of the suggested approach, in
118. See supra note 60.
119. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7 (1992).
120. Id.
121. In Penn Central, Justice Rehnquist did not consider the "transfer development rights" in
the economic analysis, but rather viewed them as compensation. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City
of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 149-51 (1978). In Keystone, Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by
Justices Powell, O'Connor and Scalia when he argued that the unit of land should be that defined
by state law, and thus the support estate should be examined separately from other interests.
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 518-19 (1987); see supra notes
58-59.
122. 475 N.W.2d 37 (Mich. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 941 (1992); see supra note 62 and
accompanying text.
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conjunction with the "economically viable use" test, could effectively
prevent building restrictions on any portions of land.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Lucas incorporated the Penn Cen-
tral balancing and the Agins two-part tests into a single analysis.
According to this analysis, courts will first determine whether an eco-
nomically viable use remains for the regulated land. If such a use
exists, the courts will evaluate whether the public benefit justifies the
hardship to the landowner. If the regulation permits no economically
viable use, the courts will then determine whether the regulation falls
within the nuisance exception. Although this new doctrine represents
a structural change in the Court's analysis, Lucas will have little sub-
stantive effect on the outcome of takings challenges in the lower
courts. However, if the Court permits "piecemealing" of property
interests, the takings doctrine in future years may require compensa-
tion for a far greater number of land use restrictions.
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